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Both Quine and Davidson put forth programs of empirical semantics satisfy-
ing the conditions that characterize the so-called “standpoint of interpreta-
tion.” Quine’s less ambitious program of radical translation rests upon two 
buttresses: causality and empathy. Davidson’s more ambitious program of 
radical interpretation replaces causality with truth and empathy with ration-
ality. Although the replacement of causality with intersubjective truth seems 
to me to be a fully justified move, I nevertheless contend that it is more real-
istic to develop the work of interpretation drawing upon Quine’s less ambi-
tious requirement of empathy than upon Davidson’s view of human agency 
as rational agency. In order to substantiate this contention, I present an ar-
gument to the effect that Davidson’s characterization of human agency as 
rational is not compatible with his other requirement that truth should pro-
vide the essential link connecting speech with environment and action. 
 
 
1. The Standpoint of Interpretation  
 
The standpoint of interpretation admits being characterized in terms of 
the thesis that empirical semantics has two possibility conditions. First, 
there has to be an essential link connecting speech with environment and 
action; second, there must be a behavioural core common to interpreter 
and interpretee. As far as I know, Wittgenstein was the first philosopher 
to have explicitly formulated this standpoint. The following statement of 
his could easily be picked up as one of its first slogans: “The common 
behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we 
interpret an unknown language” (PI, §206). 
 Both Quine and Davidson put forth programs of empirical semantics 
satisfying these conditions, namely, the program of radical translation and 
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the program of radical interpretation.  
 According to Quine’s program of radical translation, the essential link 
connecting speech with environment and action is provided by causality. 
From his standpoint, an agent’s speech has a sole “entering wedge”: ob-
servation sentences. Each such sentence gets expressed, assented to or 
dissented from as a direct causal response to patterns of stimulation affect-
ing the nervous extremities of the agent. These patterns constitute the 
stimulus-meanings of those sentences. This is how language latches on to 
the world. 
 Human speech is supposed to be a means of communication. How-
ever, patterns of stimulation of nervous extremities are not shared among 
different agents, even in cases in which these belong to the same linguistic 
community. Which is to say that stimulus-meanings are private. Thus, 
according to Quine’s view, our possibility of achieving any understanding 
of the observation sentences of others and of translating them rests en-
tirely upon our ability for projecting ourselves onto the other’s situation. 
Quine calls such a projective ability “empathy.” Quine’s empathy is sup-
posed to be perceptual, when observation sentences are the target of the 
interpretation, as well as inferential or grammatical, when, in order to be 
able to make sense of the totality of an agent’s utterances, we put forth 
what Quine terms as ‘analytical hypotheses’. Of course, a necessary condi-
tion for the success of such a practice is that interpreter and interpretee 
must share a common behavioural core.  
 Davidson’s program of radical interpretation is more ambitious. Ac-
cording to him, the essential link connecting environment, speech and 
action is provided by the concept of truth. The idea that observation 
sentences are semantically privileged because they have stimulus-
meanings and that stimulus-meanings are to be cashed out in terms of 
patterns of stimulation of nervous extremities has no appeal to Davidson. 
He rightly spots in it a survival of old-fashioned Cartesian privacy, albeit 
within a physicalistic framework. The causal connection Quine assumes 
there to exist between the world, patterns of stimulation of the speaker’s 
nervous extremities and the content of his observation sentences still falls 
short of providing him with an access to a genuinely public world. Ac-
cording to Davidson, Quine’s requirement of empathy is but a physicalis-
tic variant of older arguments by analogy. In this sense, Davidson con-
Principia 7 (1–2), June/December 2003, pp. 229–249. 
From Radical Translation 231
tends that Quine’s view is as vulnerable to traditional skeptic arguments 
regarding the possibility of our being massively mistaken about the outside 
world as traditional empiricist views were. 
 Not denying the crucial role our senses play in causally connecting us 
with the world and thus making our knowledge of it possible, Davidson 
sees the content of our sentences, observational or otherwise, to be inter-
subjectively rather than sensorially determined. Content is, according to 
him, a matter of mutual calibration originated by the similarity of our 
responses to the objects around us and to each other. Thus, we create the 
world we talk about not by responding privately to stimuli, but by inter-
acting with each other and, in so doing, observing the way others respond 
to the world and to ourselves. The truth conditions of any of our utter-
ances do belong to this public world from the outset. That is, when we 
talk at all, we talk about such things as chairs, tables, rabbits or rain and 
not about patterns of stimulation of our nervous extremities, presumably 
caused by such objects. Intersubjective truth, rather than causal impact 
on our sensitive surfaces, is then the essential link connecting speech with 
environment, action and understanding.  
 Now, if truth is supposed to play such a crucial role in the work of 
interpretation, then three further conditions must also be met. First, a lot 
of our sentences have to be true; second, there has to be such a thing as a 
language user’s attitude of taking a sentence to be true; third, the external 
manifestation of this attitude has to be intuitively recognizable by all other 
language users as being the manifestation of precisely this attitude, even if 
the content of the sentence taken to be true by the speaker is unknown to 
the interpreter. 
 Let us grant, for the sake of the argument, that these three conditions 
are indeed met in human linguistic intercourse. However, when a speaker 
speaks truly he utters not just sentences; he expresses beliefs. Now, if the 
meaning of the sentences through which he expresses his beliefs is to be 
determined by appeal to an intersubjective, public, world, then it seems 
that we need to know beforehand what true beliefs the speaker is sup-
posed to have in each particular situation in order to be able to infer from 
their content the meaning of the true sentences through which they get 
expressed. But, in order to be able to do this, we need, first, to assume that 
true beliefs issue in true sentences and that true sentences express true 
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beliefs. Secondly, we need to know how to infer a speaker’s true beliefs 
(and his desires) from his actions. And in order to be able to do the latter 
thing, we need to know something substantial about what “the common 
behaviour of mankind” is supposed to be, i.e., we need to know what is 
the particular formal structure that enables us to make sense of the pur-
poseful behaviour of the interpretees. In other words, being centered on 
social interaction rather than on the epistemic subject, Davidson’s ap-
proach needs to say something more specific about both the psychological 
background and the behavioural structure a group of agents is supposed 
to display in order to be classifiable as a group of language users.  
 Thus, rather than simply stating that the work of interpretation has to 
proceed having “the common behaviour of mankind as its system of refer-
ence,” as Wittgenstein put it, Davidson must find a way of characterizing 
this behaviour in a theoretically illuminating way. That is, a way that will 
not get reduced either to a collection of examples of behaviours with 
which we feel we can empathize or to some paraphrase or other of the 
indexical characterization ‘it is the behaviour of these creatures’ together 
with some sort of ostension having the set of human beings as its target. 
 It is precisely in this respect that his work seems to have a prima facie 
great theoretical advantage over Quine’s or Wittgenstein’s: it aims at 
providing us with such a specification. It rests on two moves. Taking seri-
ously the old Aristotelian definition of Man as the rational animal, on the 
one hand; and presenting an independent characterization of rational 
agency, on the other hand. These permit the subsequent identification of 
the common behaviour of mankind with the behaviour of rational agents. 
Therefore, what is taken to be the appropriate characterization of the 
latter is assumed to provide the system of reference in terms of which the 
work of interpretation is to proceed.  
 As a matter of fact, the conclusion we reach when we compare 
Quine’s and Davidson’s views on translation and interpretation is that, 
despite the fact that they were so close personally, they ended up putting 
forth two strikingly dissimilar views of what it means to be a language 
user. Quine’s view carries out a physicalistic reconstruction of the tradi-
tional epistemological empiricist approach to the subject; Davidson’s is 
best viewed as much more akin to David Lewis’s game-theoretical ap-
proach to the nature of language than to Quine’s. Be this as it may, 
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Davidson’s program of radical interpretation soon became dominant 
within the field of interpretationism. 
 Now, it seems to me that the path Davidson follows in his attempt to 
specify the formal structure of human behaviour is mistaken. Therefore, 
although I acknowledge the theoretical appeal of his strategy, I will con-
tend that, after having followed Davidson in leaving behind the last rem-
nants of traditional empiricism still to be found in Quine, and thus leaving 
aside all talk about stimulus-meanings, one should nevertheless return to 
what might be viewed as a modified version of Quine’s requirement of 
empathy, at least for the time being. In order to substantiate this conten-
tion, I will present an argument to the effect that Davidson’s characteriza-
tion of human agency is not compatible with his other requirement that 




2. Human Behaviour and Rational Gambling 
 
Davidson’s view of rational action is basically the one to be found in 
Bayesian decision theory. It can be summarized thus: an action is rational 
if and only if it is such that it produces an outcome which is the best ac-
cording to the agent’s desires and the beliefs he entertains; an agent is 
rational if and only if his actions are, in general, rational. To be sure, such 
a definition does not yet yield a criterion to decide between competing 
courses of action which of them is the best; it is only a definition stating 
what it means to say of a given action that it is rational. In particular, it is 
a definition equating rationality with optimality. The criterion specifying 
how is one to assess which of a given set of possible actions is, under each 
circumstance, the best or one of the best is the so-called principle of 
“maximization of expected utility.”  
 This principle can in turn be accounted for thus. Desires are meant to 
be pro-attitudes towards representations of outcomes of actions. The 
different outcomes taken to be possible under each particular set of cir-
cumstances are, in turn, supposed to be ranked in a scale determined by 
the assignment of real-numerical values to them, according to their re-
spective degree of desirability or utility. Beliefs are meant to be truth-
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evaluable attitudes towards representations of particular states of the 
world assumed to be relevant to the determination of the outcome of the 
agent’s action. The likelihood the agent ascribes to the obtaining of any of 
these particular states of the world varies along a probability scale. To act 
rationally in a particular situation is then to act in a way that admits being 
modelled as resulting from the following succession of steps. First, the 
subjective probability ascribed to the obtaining of each relevant state of 
the world is multiplied by the subjective utility ascribed to the obtaining 
of each of the possible outcomes of the action. Secondly, the products so 
obtained are added; the sum thus obtained is then called the subjective 
expected utility of undertaking a given course of action. Thirdly, once 
steps one and two were iterated in connection with all possible courses of 
action, a decision to act in a certain way is reached by selecting that 
course of action the expected utility of which is maximal.  
 Human actions are part of our experience. They are events taking 
place in space and time before us. If a theory of rational action such as the 
one described above is to be taken to be a theory of human action, then 
its truth ought to be empirically verifiable, at least in principle. Prima facie, 
the decision-theoretical framework should admit being put to the trial of 
experience in the usual way. That is, the principle of maximization of 
expected utility should be taken to be a law relating sets of upstream con-
ditions with sets of downstream consequences. The theory would then be 
in agreement with reality if and only if upstream conditions and down-
stream consequences would relate to each other in the way prescribed by 
the lawlike principle. The verification of this requirement should then 
involve the following stages. First, the correct identification of the beliefs 
and desires of the agent, and of their respective strengths, on the one 
hand, and the correct identification of the action related to them in any 
particular occasion. Second, the confirmation that agents do act in 
agreement with the principle of maximization of expected utility. 
 However, and as a number of authors have noted, one is faced with a 
major problem here. It is the following. The procedures set up within the 
theoretical framework of Bayesian decision theory in order to allow us to 
arrive at a positive identification of the agent’s beliefs and desires are pro-
cedures that make sense only if one assumes from the outset that agents 
act according to the principle of maximization of expected utility. The 
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situation one is faced with is thus the following. In order to test the valid-
ity of a relational principle one needs, prima facie, to have an independent 
access to the relata such a principle relates. However, when one considers 
this theory carefully, one realizes that, even assuming the content of hu-
man actions to be transparent, the assumption that the relational princi-
ple holds is a necessary condition to identify the upstream relata, namely, 
beliefs and desires. In other words, there seems to exist no access to a 
substantial part of the relevant empirical evidence outside of the frame-
work of the theory itself. This means that no empirical check can be made 
before such a framework is itself subject to a closer examination. 
 What such a closer examination reveals is that Bayesian decision 
theory is based on an analysis of what one might call ‘the behaviour of a 
rational gambler’. That is, it is based on a couple of axioms that formalize 
the behaviour a gambler needs to have in a game of chance if he is to 
avoid losing money whatever happens. The thesis according to which this 
theory is empirically true boils down then to an analogical claim. Namely, 
the claim that human agents behave in their normal life in the same way 
as a rational gambler behaves in a game of chance. Now, does such a 
claim hold true of the facts? This is what needs to be checked. 
 Obviously, the fact that in a game of chance one needs to behave 
according to the axioms of the theory in order to avoid losing money 
whatever happens is by itself no proof that the theory is empirically true of 
human behaviour in general. It may well be the case, for all we know, that 
most humans are not rational gamblers anyway and that therefore in a 
game of chance they would easily fall in situations in which they would 
lose to a professional gambler no matter what happens. Or it may well be 
the case that despite the fact that most humans behave as rational gam-
blers when placed in the context of a game of chance, they do not behave 
in real life as if it were a game of chance, i.e., the analogical claim may be 
false. Therefore, if the theory is to be empirically true of human actions in 
general then its axioms will have to hold in most everyday life situations. 
This is the crucial point. As a matter of fact, if the axioms hold true of the 
way everyday decision problems are solved by most people, then the valid-
ity of the principle of maximization of expected utility follows by purely 
mathematical means. That is, such a principle is a theorem of the theory 
and not one of its axioms.  
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 Different axiom systems and slightly different versions for what are 
basically the same axioms have been put forth in the relevant literature. 
However, two of them are, in any of the available versions, crucial for the 
outlining of the structure of a rational gambler’s behaviour. They are the 
following. First, the axiom I will call “Axiom A”; it holds that a certain 
relation, namely, the relation “it is at least as preferred as” (or, in another 
version, “it is at most as preferred as”) obtains between the coordinates of 
any pair of outcomes open to the agent’s consideration and that such a 
relation is a weak linear ordering (or connected preorder), i.e., that it is a 
binary relation satisfying the following properties: transitivity, reflexivity 
and also connectedness. Second, the axiom I will call “Axiom B”; it states 
that if an option A is at least as preferred as an option B then, if options C 
and D result from, respectively, options A and B by the introduction of 
the same change in their common outcomes, then option C is at least as 
preferred as option D.  
 Axiom A can be justified thus. It is this axiom that allows utilities to 
be put in a one-one correlation with real numbers, that is, that allows 
them to be measured in such a way that both their places in the utility 
ranking and their intrinsic differences of value are adequately expressed 
by the assignment of real-numerical representatives to them. Actually, 
transitivity is the essential property for this purpose. As a matter of fact, 
the admission that failures of transitivity might exist would entail two 
consequences. First, the consequence that actual utility rankings are not 
representable by means of ordinal utility scales and that therefore the 
whole process of selecting that course of action the expected utility of 
which is highest becomes pointless. Second, the consequence that the 
holding of an intransitive gambling pattern is liable to make a gambler 
lose money for no gain whatsoever to a smart gambler, that is, the conse-
quence that such a gambler is not rational in the decision-theoretical 
sense of this word.  
 Axiom B can be justified thus. It follows, together with other uncon-
troversial assumptions, from what is taken to be a very simple and intui-
tively appealing decision strategy. Such a strategy is the following: when 
trying to figure out what is the act which is more advantageous to him, 
the agent should consider only those elements of a set of mutually exclu-
sive and jointly exhaustive possible futures states of the world which have 
Principia 7 (1–2), June/December 2003, pp. 229–249. 
From Radical Translation 237
different outcomes (that is, states with the same outcomes should cancel 
out). 
 Both these axioms have already been put to test. The empirical ade-
quacy of axiom A has been checked by experiments devised by Tversky. 
The empirical adequacy of axiom B has been checked and subject to ex-
tended discussions in connection with the so-called “Allais’ Problem.”  
 Tversky’s experiments elaborate upon Condorcet’s voting paradox. 
As is well known, Condorcet pointed out that social inconsistencies 
might arise out of consistent individual choices. In particular, he has 
shown that majority voting generates an intransitive pattern of prefer-
ences whenever a set of three individuals x, y and z consider a set of three 
options A, B and C in such a way that x ranks the options according to 
the scale ABC, y ranks them according to the scale BCA and z ranks 
them according to the scale CAB and the options are subject to a se-
quence of three alternative votings. Examples of this kind were later 
taken to provide a useful illustration to the unsolved difficulties associated 
with the idea of providing a social welfare function. The peculiarity of 
Tversky’s own work consists in the fact that he has shown by means of a 
variety of psychological experiments that a similar pattern of intransitive 
preferences can arise out of the choices of a single agent who ranks his 
options on two dimensions in such a way that the agent’s payoff matrix 
has the structure of a lexicographic semi-order. He has moreover shown 
that in a number of situations it is not uncommon for agents so to rank 
their options. 
 Allais’ problem was initially introduced as a thought-experiment; 
however, it received later empirical confirmation. It consists in the suc-
cessive consideration of two decision situations each involving two gam-
bles. The result of the experiment is such that the set of two successive 
choices made by most agents violates Axiom B. These choices have the 
following character. In the first choice, agents typically choose a gamble in 
which they win a large amount of money outright in place of a gamble in 
which the winning of that very same amount of money is uncertain and 
has to be weighed against a small probability of winning 5 times as much 
and an even smaller probability of winning nothing. In the second choice, 
agents are confronted with a set of two gambles in which the dominant 
outcome is winning nothing. In this case, they typically choose the gamble 
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in which the highest prize is at stake, despite the fact that the probability 
of winning it is slightly inferior to the probability of winning the also large 
but yet 5 times smaller prize they chose in the first choice. 
 These and other similar experiments should have settled the question 
concerning the empirical validity of the theory. As a matter of fact, if the 
descriptive character of the theory hinges upon the descriptive character 
of its axioms, then, if such axioms are shown not to be empirically true of 
the behaviour of normal human agents in a non negligible number of 
decision situations, then it should follow that the theory as a whole can-
not be ascribed the character of a descriptive theory of human choice 
behaviour. In particular, it should follow that its main theorem, namely, 
the theorem according to which agents maximize expected utility, cannot 
be ascribed the character of a lawlike principle relating the upstream con-
ditions and the downstream consequences associated with the unfolding 
of human actions. And if this is so, it should also obviously follow that 
such a theorem cannot be simply assumed to hold in order to infer the 
content of an agent’s beliefs and desires from such an assumption together 
with the knowledge of the content of some downstream effects and a bit 
of mathematical reasoning. Assuming that one has some independent 
way of identifying one’s beliefs and desires, the principle codified in this 
theorem may or may not be a powerful normative standard for decision-
making, prescribing the way one should go about making one’s decisions 
in order to optimise one’s gains; as an empirical proposition, however, it 
seems that it must be deemed to be false.  
 
 
3. The Appeal to the Synthetic a priori 
 
The conclusion above is far from being universally accepted though. The 
verdict of empirical falsity has been evaded by quite a number of authors, 
a leading representative of which is precisely Davidson. The main argu-
ment underlying such a response is basically the following.  
 In order to test the above-mentioned axioms, experiments had to be 
made. Now, what these experiments yielded were behavioural data, and 
these had to be interpreted. In particular, the actual choice behaviours of 
the agents had to be classified under particular characterizations. Other-
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wise, it would not have been possible to assert that, e.g., failures of transi-
tivity had taken place. However, the above-mentioned assumption ac-
cording to which the content of our actions could be considered to be 
basically transparent is untrue. That is, the identification of the down-
stream relata depends as much as the identification of the upstream relata 
on the use of a theoretical framework within which particular interpreta-
tions may be considered to make sense. And there is no compelling rea-
son why the interpretational constraints that should be at work here 
should not be precisely those constraints that are set up by the very same 
axioms the experiments in question were trying to check. Under such 
circumstances, instead of providing evidence in favour of the inappropri-
ateness of the tested axioms, the results of the experiments should be 
reinterpreted in such a way that the content of the actions displayed in 
them might come out agreeing with the axioms after all. And this is some-
thing that is not particularly difficult to do. Consider for instance the 
following reinterpretation proposals.  
 Take the case of Tversky’s experiments first. Someone might chal-
lenge his conclusions by making the following claims. In order to uncover 
the alleged existence of intransitive sets of preferences the experimenter 
must confront different sets of choices of the same subject with each 
other. Now, by necessity, the subjects go through these choice processes 
in time. Therefore, each choice must be separated from any other choice 
by a certain amount of time. Under such circumstances, why should the 
experimenter not simply interpret the data as exhibiting the plain fact that 
under the sort of circumstances present in Tversky’s experiments subjects 
tend to change their minds?  
 Take now the case of Allais’ Problem. The correctness of the verdict 
that Axiom B has been violated in the experiment devised by Allais de-
pends entirely upon an unformulated assumption. This is the assumption 
that the consequences under consideration are to be fully characterized 
by their monetary values. But why should they? Why not include non-
monetary considerations, such as, e.g., considerations of risk-aversion, in 
the way the consequences should be perceived? The inclusion of consid-
erations of such a sort may make it possible to reinterpret the data in such 
a way that Axiom B comes out of the experiments unscathed. 
 In sum, the idea is that the axioms of the theory should be taken to 
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have the status of synthetic a priori truths about our behavioural patterns. 
Such a strategy can certainly not be ruled out from the set of prima facie 
admissible interpretive strategies. And given that there is no external 
court of appeal capable of judge once and for all the correctness or incor-
rectness of any particular interpretation in any particular situation, one 
must settle for fruitfulness in the long run. In the meantime, one should 
stick to the sort of reasoning by analogy first introduced by Ramsey, the 
outcome of which is a theory possessing two important advantages: it is 
conceptually simple and it lends itself to mathematical formalization. 
 I think that the line of reasoning described above runs the risk of 
leaving the doors wide open to the generation of all sorts of epicycles. As 
a matter of fact, I do think that, at least in the case of Tversky’s experi-
ments, the interpretation according to which subjects developed intransi-
tive sets of preferences is not only much more intuitively plausible and 
charitable than the rival strategy of ascribing a flickering character to 
quite a number of human subjects but it also makes more cognitive sense. 
However, I am not going to pursue this line of argument here, as I have 
already done it elsewhere. What I want to stress here is the following 
aspect. I think that the line of escape that appeals to the synthetic a priori, 
implausible as it may be, is nonetheless a possible line of escape for deci-
sion-theorists such as Ramsey, Savage or Jeffrey. I also think that such a 
line of escape is not available to the theorist who made an explicit appeal 
to it, namely, Davidson. Below I will explain why.  
 
 
4. Truth and Understanding 
 
Both Ramsey and Savage used gambles as the means to find out what 
agents believed and desired and how seriously did they do it. It was a con-
sequence of their proposal that the utility scales and the probability distri-
butions ascribed to agents might be strongly at variance with the content 
of the sentences of the very same agents concerning the objects of their 
desires and the contents of their beliefs. Indeed, the whole idea of the 
enterprise was precisely to create the theoretical framework within which 
a scientific study of human actions would be made possible. As in other 
fields of study, it was only to be expected that the result of the theoretic 
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activity would frequently be in disagreement with people’s impressionistic 
and intuitive assessments of the phenomena under consideration. Obvi-
ously, it is in natural discourse that such an impressionistic and intuitive 
assessment of psychological phenomena gets expressed. Therefore, no 
wide agreement was to be expected between either first-person or third-
person natural discourse descriptions of intentional behaviour and the 
reports of the outcome of theoretically conducted behaviour experiments. 
As Ramsey put it, his “artificial system of psychology” was to be compared 
with Newtonian mechanics and not with what one might term ‘Folk-
Physics’. Thus, Ramsey’s identifications of the belief-desire structures of 
agents were meant to be theoretical identifications of the causes of ac-
tions, of the same sort of, e.g., the identification of water with H2O, and 
not conceptual analyses of the way agents usually express their views 
about the unfolding of actions. Natural discourse played a role in the 
application of this “artificial system of psychology” only insofar as subjects 
had to understand the gambles they were invited to consider. 
 The objects to which Ramsey and Savage ascribed degrees of belief 
were possible states of the world and the objects to which they ascribed 
degrees of desire were consequences of acts. The connection between 
them was established through the above-mentioned gambles. Jeffrey, 
however, replaced propositions for both possible states of the world and 
consequences of acts as unified objects of belief and desire. He understood 
propositions as abstract objects referred to by sentences but in no way 
exchangeable with them. And, in particular, he considered that the sen-
tences professed by subjects concerning the objects of their own beliefs 
and desires were only in an evidential relation rather than in a relation of 
reference with the propositions that indeed constituted the objects of the 
subjects’ beliefs and desires. He clearly endorsed the thesis that one may 
be in doubt or in error about what one’s beliefs and desires are and that 
the touchstone is actual choice. In particular, he stated that agents might 
be unwilling to assent to the very same sentences that are used by the 
theorist to correctly express the proposition that is the content of their 
belief or of their desire. Thus, he also thought that the outcomes of the 
scientific study of action might be at variance with what natural discourse 
has to say on such a topic. The criteria for belief and desire are, according 
to him, behavioural, and speech is but a particular sort of behaviour 
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among others. 
 All this is in perfect harmony with the idea according to which the 
axioms of Bayesian decision theory are synthetic a priori truths about the 
structure of human intentional behaviour. One may suspect that there is 
no more truth in such a contention than there is truth in the contention 
that the axioms of Euclidian geometry are synthetic a priori truths regu-
lating our geometrical knowledge but that is all. Davidson’s Theory of 
Interpretation is, however, a different matter.  
 This theory contains a slightly modified version of Jeffrey’s version of 
Bayesian decision theory, namely, a version in which Davidson substitutes 
uninterpreted sentences for propositions as the objects of preferences. 
Such a substitution is needed, because Davidson uses decision theory not 
as the framework of a scientific theory of action but rather as the scaffold 
by means of the support of which the work of radical interpretation is 
supposed to succeed. 
 Now, we have seen above that, according to what seems to be our 
intuitive way of classifying it, the behaviour of the members of our own 
community is frequently at variance with the expectations decision-
theory brings about. It takes an extra interpretive effort, supported by a 
theoretical argument carried out in the languages we already speak and 
understand, to accommodate that behaviour, under those circumstances, 
within the framework laid down by the theory. It may well be that the 
outcome of such work of accommodation is the right scientific or para-
scientific account of such behaviours. But if this is true, then what normal 
people tend to say about such behaviours, even assuming their sincerity, is 
just wrong. If this is so, however, either both ordinary people’s beliefs 
about the sources of their intentional behaviour and the sentences that 
express them are false or these beliefs are true but they do not issue in 
true sentences. Either way, the first of the above mentioned possibility 
conditions for Davidsonian empirical semantics, namely, the requirement 
that truth should be the essential link connecting speech with environ-
ment, action and understanding is not satisfied. And, if this condition is 
not satisfied, then, if we assume the thesis of Davidson’s version of inter-
pretationism to be correct, no empirical semantics of these intentional 
sentences is possible.  
 This is an interesting result. In Word and Object, Quine claimed 
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that the right way to interpret sentences of belief-ascription would be 
to view them as containing only one term referring the holder of the 
attitude and a syntactically complex but semantically simple monadic 
predicate, containing both the verb of the attitude and the sentence 
describing its content. In a paper called “Theories of Meaning and 
Learnable Languages,” Davidson rightly claims that Quine’s view en-
tails that the segments of our natural languages containing idioms of 
propositional attitude must be unlearnable. From this claim, it follows 
that Quine’s interpretation must be wrong, since no segment of any 
effectively spoken natural language can be unlearnable. Ironically, 
Davidson’s charge against Quine seems to bounce back now. As a 
matter of fact, if both a decision-theoretical framework and truth are 
necessary conditions for the possibility of setting up an empirical se-
mantics, then, if what was said above is right, lots of folk-psychological 
sentences must lie outside the scope of radical interpretation. Accord-
ing to Davidson, however, these sentences constitute the very founda-
tion of radical interpretation. Therefore, the latter enterprise simply 
cannot be done. 
 Let me elaborate a bit more upon this. Imagine that some choice 
behaviours are being performed by members of foreign communities the 
language of which we completely ignore. If we are going to use the axioms 
of decision-theory as the scaffold in terms of the support of which we are 
going to interpret not only their actions but also what they say about 
them, then, if we assume, with Davidson, that the conceptual system 
underlying the semantics of their unknown natural language is going to be 
similar to ours, then their way of describing their common behaviour is 
going to be as wrong as ours. If this is so, having recourse to the apparatus 
of classical Bayesian decision theory cannot be the right way of character-
izing the behavioural structure that does provide the system of reference 
by means of which their unknown natural language is going to be inter-
pretable. Note that the only way of avoiding this conclusion is to postu-
late that the speakers of this unknown foreign language are inborn scien-
tific psychologists. And remember that, assuming that some version or 
other of Ramsey’s “artificial system of Psychology” is true, we know that 
we are no such thing. Thus, the introduction of such a postulate leads us 
outright to contradiction.  
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 Let me stress once more that it is not my intention to present here a 
challenge to the intrinsic value of the decision-theoretical framework. To 
see that this is so, we need only remember that, within Ramsey’s “artificial 
system of psychology,” beliefs are defined as the (partial) causes of action. 
No assumption of transparency is made. Qua partial causes of his action, 
an agent’s beliefs may well be true, and yet, still assuming sincerity, the 
sentences in terms of which he, or somebody else, formulates them may 
well be false. That is, it may well be the case that the agent (or his un-
trained observer) does not know or is not aware of what beliefs he in fact 
has. Again, that something like this should be expected to be the case was 
precisely the scientific motivation underlying Ramsey’s development of 
his “artificial system of Psychology.”  
 However, the option of accepting the decision-theoretical definition 
of the rational agent as basically true of us and of considering that scien-
tific psychology should be built upon it comes with a price. This is the 
severing of the supposedly essential link of veridicality connecting our 
common ways of speaking with our common ways of acting. Severing that 
link has two clear consequences. The first is that ordinary ways of talking 
will have to be dismissed as irrelevant for the understanding of our com-
mon ways of acting; the second is that the knowledge of our common 
ways of acting will have to be dismissed as irrelevant for the understand-
ing of our common ways of talking. Or, at least, they will have to be so 
dismissed until somebody comes along with a theory explaining in detail 
the convoluted ways in which our untrue ordinary way of talking about 
our actions is related to the true explanatory theory of action and vice-
versa. Such a theory does not seem to be in the offing, however. 
 In short, I would like to say that one cannot have it both ways: to 
claim, in the hope of procuring a foundation for empirical semantics, that 
an essential connection of veridicality should hold between speech, envi-
ronment and action, on the one hand; and to severe that connection in 
order to make the interpretational theory conceptually simple and 
mathematically tractable, on the other hand. However, it seems to me 
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5. Rationality, the Ways of Man and Empathy 
 
A supporter of interpretationism will have to criticize Davidson’s ap-
proach in one of the two following ways. Either he challenges the cogency 
of Davidson’s independent characterization of rational agency, or he chal-
lenges the view according to which Man is the rational animal. Given the 
vagueness of the concept of rationality itself, the choice between these 
two criticisms gets eventually reduced to a mere choice of words.  
 As a matter of fact, if he enjoys the use of the term ‘is rational’ in 
association with human matters then he should want to stick to the old 
Aristotelian definition of Man. Under those circumstances, the interpre-
tationist should criticize the allegedly independent definition of rational 
agency Davidson puts forth as wrong. But if he does not have any strong 
feelings associated with the use of the predicate ‘is rational’ to characterize 
the ways of Man, the interpretationist could still easily accept Davidson’s 
definition of rational agency as correct and at the same time deny the 
rationality of Man. Under such circumstances, he would have to refuse 
the thesis that a definition of rational agency ought to be used as the sys-
tem of reference by means of which any unknown language is to be inter-
preted and he would have to look for a less grand and more parochial way 
of characterizing the ways of Man. Either way, what is relevant is that 
Davidson’s characterization of rational agency turns out not to be an 
appropriate way of modelling the manner in which human agency tends 
to be described in our natural languages. Thus, grounding the work of 
interpretation upon such a characterization is most certainly going to lead 
the interpreter into the selection, as interpretive, of non-interpretive T-
theories for the natural languages of foreign communities. 
 Leaving undecidable controversies about the right way to use the 
predicate ‘is rational’ aside, what other means of characterizing theoreti-
cally the ways of Man do we have then? Recent research in Cognitive 
Psychology has consistently shown the structure underlying human 
agency to be of a much greater complexity than previously thought. By 
itself, this need not be a reason for interpretational despair. At the same 
time, however, evidence has also been piling up according to which hu-
mans share a largely innate set of linguistic structures, concepts and be-
liefs, and that these play a major role in our use and understanding of 
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language. This might mean that the interpretation of speech may, at least 
partly, be achieved independently of the acquisition of an elaborate ac-
count of the workings of other human cognitive structures, namely, of the 
structures underlying the triggering of intentional action. If this is true, 
then interpretationists do have reasons for worry. 
 It is at this stage that I suggest that a retreat to what might be viewed 
as a modified version of Quine’s initial requirement of empathy can be of 
use. Instead of referring the analogical projection onto another of the 
private stimuli of the subject, the term ‘empathy’ would in this modified 
version of Quine’s requirement refer the sort of inborn predisposition 
humans seem to have for coping with their conspecifics. (As a matter of 
fact, this seems to me to be the way the term is actually used by Quine in 
From Stimulus to Science, by contrast with the way the term was used by 
him in Word and Object, and other earlier essays). Be this as it may, and in 
spite of the fact that it is not satisfying when matters are considered from 
an explanatory standpoint, the appeal to such a revised concept of empa-
thy in order to account for the possibility of linguistic understanding en-
ables us to achieve two results. On the one hand, it enables us to stay 
away from a commitment to implausible accounts of linguistic under-
standing such as the one that views it as the result of an overt negotiation 
in which logically sophisticated creatures act along decision-theoretical 
lines and expect others to do the same. On the other hand, the lack of 
theoretical specificity characterizing it has the advantage of leaving room 
for the progressive integration into a future theory of interpretation of the 
description of the features of a speaker’s interpersonal experience that 
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Bayesian decision theory, empathy, empirical semantics,  
radical interpretation, radical translation, truth, rationality. 
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Tanto Quine quanto Davidson desenvolvem programas de semântica empírica 
que satisfazem as condições que caracterizam o chamado “ponto de vista da in-
terpretação.” O programa menos ambicioso de Quine para a tradução radical 
se fundamenta em dois alicerces: a causalidade e a empatia. O programa mais 
ambicioso de Davidson para a interpretação radical substitui a causalidade pela 
verdade e a empatia pela racionalidade. Embora a substituição da causalidade 
pela verdade intersubjetiva nos pareça ser um movimento inteiramente justificá-
vel, contudo, argumentamos que é mais realista desenvolver o trabalho de inter-
pretação com base ns requisito menos ambicioso de Quine, da empatia, que na 
concepção de Davidson, da atuação [agency] humana como atuação racional. 
Para fundamentar essa alegação, apresentamos um argumento segundo o qual a 
caracterização que Davidson faz da atuação humana como racional não é com-
patível com seu outro requisito de que a verdade deveria dar a ligação essencial 




Teoria da decisão bayesiana, empatia, semântica empírica,  
interpretação radical, tradução radical, verdade, rationalidade.  
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